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ABSTRACT
Frequency non-selective time-selective multiple access channels in
which transmitters can freely choose their power control policy are
considered. The individual objective of the transmitters is to maxi-
mize their averaged energy-efficiency. For this purpose, a transmit-
ter has to choose a power control policy that is, a sequence of power
levels adapted to the channel variations. This problem can be formu-
lated as a stochastic game with discounting for which there exists a
theorem characterizing all the equilibrium utilities (equilibrium util-
ity region). As in its general formulation, this theorem relies on
global channel state information (CSI), it is shown that some points
of the utility region can be reached with individual CSI. Interestingly,
time-sharing based solutions, which are usually considered for cen-
tralized policies, appear to be part of the equilibrium solutions. This
analysis is illustrated by numerical results providing further insights
to the problem under investigation.
Index Terms— Distributed power control, Stochastic games,
Folk theorem, Nash equilibrium, Game Theory.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, new types of wireless networks have appeared.
Just to name a few, when inspecting the wireless literature, we find
ad hoc networks, networks of wireless devices operating in unli-
censed bands, wireless networks with cognitive radios, small cells
based cellular networks. The decentralized nature of such networks
make game-theoretic analyses relevant [1]. Interestingly, game the-
ory offers a large set of tools and concepts to better understand im-
portant problems such as resources allocation and power control in
distributed networks. By distributed, it is meant that the allocation
or/and control policy is left to the terminal itself. In this paper,
the problem under consideration is precisely the one of distributed
power control. The assumed network model is a multiple access
channel (MAC), which, by definition, includes several transmitters
and one common receiver. A brief overview of previous works about
power allocation for MACs is presented in [2]. In our framework,
based on a certain knowledge which includes his individual chan-
nel state information, each transmitter has to tune his power level
for each data block. In particular, it can ignore some specified cen-
tralized policies. The assumed performance criterion is the one in-
troduced by [3] that is to say, that transmitters aim at maximizing
the energy efficiency associated with the transmit radio-frequency
signal, which is measured as a number of correctly decoded infor-
mation bits per Joule consumed at the transmitter. The assumed
channel model is the same as [3] that is, links are assumed to be fre-
quency non-selective but the channel gains can vary from block to
block. The authors of [3] have formalized the energy-efficient power
control problem as a one-shot/static non-cooperative game: on each
block, the players (the transmitters) play a one-shot game by choos-
ing their action/move (their power level) in order to maximize their
utility (their individual energy-efficiency). The main drawback of
such a formulation is that it leads to an outcome (Nash equilibrium)
which is not efficient. Indeed, it can be checked that, for each block,
there exists a vector of power levels (an action profile) which allows
all the players to have better utilities than those obtained at the Nash
equilibrium; the latter is said to be Pareto-dominated.
Motivated by the existence of power profiles which Pareto-
dominates the one-shot game Nash equilibrium solution, several
authors proposed solutions which are both efficient and compatible
with the framework of decentralized decisions. For instance, pricing
is proposed in [4], a Stackelberg formulation is introduced in [5],
and a repeated game formulation is exploited in [6]. The framework
adopted in this paper is a more general framework than the one cho-
sen in [6]. Indeed, although the repeated game model in [6] takes
into account the fact that transmitters interact several/many times,
the work in [6] has an important weakness: this is the need for a
normalized game which does not depend on the realization channels.
By definition (see e.g., [7]), a repeated game consists in repeating
the same one-shot game. The consequence of such a modeling
choice is a loss in terms of optimality in terms of expected utilities
(averaged over the channel realizations). The main purpose of this
paper is to propose a more general dynamic game model namely,
a stochastic game. Based on this choice, the contributions of this
paper are essentially as follows: (i) after providing the signal model
(Sec. 2) and reviewing the one-shot game model (Sec. 3) we present
the stochastic game model used and show how to exploit the recent
game-theoretic results by [8][9] to obtain a Folk theorem for the
power control game under investigation: this Folk theorem allows
one to fully characterize equilibrium utilities when public signals are
available to the transmitters and channel stats are quantized (Sec. 4);
(ii) some simple equilibrium power control strategies relying on
individual channel state information and possibly a recommenda-
tion of the receiver are proposed (Sec. 5); (iii) a numerical study is
conducted to assess the performance of the proposed strategies and
give more insights on tuning the relevant parameters of the problem
(Sec. 6).
2. SIGNAL MODEL
We consider a decentralized MAC with K ≥ 1 transmitters. The
network is said to be decentralized as the receiver (e.g., a base
station) does not dictate to the transmitters (e.g., mobile stations)
their power control policy. Rather, all the transmitters choose their
policy by themselves and want to selfishly maximize their energy-
efficiency; in particular, they can ignore some specified centralized
policies. We assume that the users transmit their data over quasi-
static channels, at the same time and frequency band and without
any beamforming [10]. Note that a block is defined as a sequence
of M ≥ 1 consecutive symbols which contains a training sequence:
a specific symbols sequence used to estimate the channel (or other
related quantities) associated with a given block. A block has there-
fore a duration less than the channel coherence time. The signal
model used corresponds to the information-theoretic channel model
used for studying MAC, see [2] for more comments on the multiple
access technique involved. This model is both simple to be pre-
sented and captures the different aspects of the problem. It can be
readily applied to specific systems such as CDMA systems [3][5] or
multi-carrier CDMA systems [11]. The equivalent baseband signal
received by the base station can be written as
y(n) =
K∑
i=1
gi(n)xi(n) + z(n) (1)
where i ∈ K, K = {1, ..., K}, xi(n) represents the symbol trans-
mitted by transmitter i at time n, E|xi|2 = pi, the noise z is as-
sumed to be distributed according to a zero-mean Gaussian random
variable with variance σ2 and each channel gain gi varies over time
but is assumed to be constant over each block. For each transmit-
ter i, the channel gain modulus is assumed to lie in a compact set
|gi|
2 ∈
[
ηmini , η
max
i
]
. This assumption models the finite receiver
sensitivity and the existence of a minimum distance between the
transmitter and receiver. At last, the receiver is assumed to imple-
ment single-user decoding.
At a given instant, the SINR at receiver i ∈ K writes as:
SINRi =
piηi∑
j 6=i pjηj + σ
2
(2)
where pi is the power level for transmitter i and ηi = |gi|2.
.
3. ONE-SHOT POWER CONTROL GAME
In this section, the one-shot game model of [3] is reviewed since it
both allows one to build the stochastic game model of Sec. 4 and
serves as a reference for performance comparison. A useful (non-
equilibrium) operating point in this game is also defined, as a basis
for the proposed control strategies in the stochastic game model.
Definition 1 (One-shot power control game) The strategic form
of the one-shot power control game is a triplet
G = (K, {Ai}i∈K, {ui}i∈K) where K is the set of players,
A1, ...,AK are the corresponding sets of actions, Ai = [0, Pmaxi ],
Pmaxi is the maximum transmit power for player i, and u1, ..., uK
are the utilities of the different players which are defined by:
ui(p1, ..., pK) =
Rif(SINRi)
pi
[bit/J]. (3)
We denote by Ri the transmission information rate (in bps) for
user i and f an efficiency function representing the block success
rate. The numerator of the utility is thus the rate of bits success-
fully received at the base station. f is assumed to be sigmoidal and
identical for all the users; the sigmoidness assumption is a reason-
able assumption, which is well justified in [12][13]. Recently, [14]
has shown that this assumption is also justified from an information-
theoretic standpoint.
In this game with complete information (G is known to every
player) and rational players (every player does the best for himself
and knows the others do so and so on), a major game solution con-
cept is the Nash equilibrium (i.e. a point from which no player has
interest in unilaterally deviating). When it exists, the non-saturated1
Nash equilibrium of this game can be obtained by setting ∂ui
∂pi
to
zero ∀i ∈ K which gives an equivalent condition on the SINR: the
best SINR in terms of energy-efficiency for transmitter i has to be
a solution of xf ′(x) − f(x) = 0 (this solution is independent of
the player index since a common efficiency function is assumed, see
[13] for more details). This leads to:
∀i ∈ {1, ..., K}, p∗i =
σ2
ηi
β∗
1− (K − 1)β∗
(4)
where β∗ is the unique solution of the equation xf ′(x)− f(x) = 0.
An important property of the Nash equilibrium given by (4) is that
transmitters only need to know their individual channel gain ηi to
play their equilibrium strategy. Another interesting property is that
the product p∗i ηi (instantaneous received power) is constant for all
the players.
Interestingly, the authors of [6] propose to study the power pro-
file obtained when imposing the received signals to have the same
instantaneous power. The idea is to solve ∂ui
∂pi
(p) = 0 under the
aforementioned constraint. This leads to the following system:
∀(i, j) ∈ K2,
{
piηi = pjηj
∂ui
∂pi
(p) = 0
(5)
The unique solution of (5), called Operating point can be
checked to be:
∀i ∈ K, p˜i =
σ2
ηi
γ˜K
1− (K − 1)γ˜K
(6)
where γ˜K is the unique solution of x[1−(K−1) ·x]f ′(x)−f(x) =
0.
The difference between this operating point and the Nash equi-
librium can be explained by the fact that ∂ui
∂pi
(p) = ∂ui
∂pi
(pi) when
adding the instantaneous power equality constraint. This operating
point can be proved to always Pareto-dominate the Nash equilibrium
and reach the Pareto frontier for each channel realization; addition-
ally, only individual CSI is needed to operate at the corresponding
power levels. This point will serve as a basis of the power control
strategies proposed in Sec. 5.
4. STOCHASTIC POWER CONTROL GAME
With the one-shot non-cooperative game model, transmitters are
assumed to play once for each bock and independently from block
to block. The goal here is to take into account the fact that trans-
mitters generally interact over several blocks, which is likely to
change their behavior w.r.t. the one-shot interaction model even if
1By using the term “non-saturated Nash equilibrium” we mean that the
maximum transmit power for each user, denoted by Pmaxi , is assumed to be
sufficiently high not to be reached at the equilibrium i.e. each user maximizes
his energy-efficiency for a value less than Pmaxi (see [5] for more details
about the saturated case).
they are always assumed to be selfish. As channel gains are time-
varying, the most natural model is the one of stochastic games [15].
In such a model, important differences w.r.t. the one-shot game
model are that averaged utilities are considered, the channel state
η(t) = (η1(t), ..., ηK(t)) ∈ Γ and Γ = Γ1 × Γ2 × ... × ΓK may
vary according to a certain evolution law (the i.i.d. block fading case
is the most simple of them), and the state can depend on the played
actions (in conventional wireless settings this is however not the
case). Stochastic game stages correspond to instants at which play-
ers can choose their actions. From one stage to another, the channel
state η(t) is assumed to be discrete (e.g., resulting from quantization
effects) and stochastically varies according to the transition prob-
ability distribution pi. This distribution is said to be an irreducible
transition probability if for any pair of channel states η and η′ we
have pi(η′|η) > 0. For example, this irreducibility condition is met
for i.i.d channels. The second important assumption we do to obtain
a Folk theorem is to assume that a public signal is available to all the
transmitters. Two special cases of interest are: (a) Every transmitter
knows the power of the received signal that is,
∑K
i=1 ηipi + σ
2 is
known; (b) Every transmitter has global CSI and perfectly observes
the action profiles that is, (η, p) is known.
The game Course. The game starts at the first stage with a
channel state η(1) known by the players. The transmitters simul-
taneously choose their power level p(1) = (p1(1), . . . , pK(1)) and
are assumed to receive a public signal, denoted θ ∈ Θ. At stage
t, the channel states η(t) are drawn from the transition probability
pi(·|η(t− 1)) ∈ ∆(Γ) and the players observe the public signal
φ :
∣∣∣∣ Γ×A → Θ(η, p) 7→ θ (7)
where A = A1 × ... × AK . The sequence of past signals h(t) =
(θ(1)..., θ(t− 1), η(t)) is the common history of the players.
Definition 2 (Players’ strategies) A strategy for player i ∈ K is a
sequence of functions (τi,t)t≥1 with
τi,t :
∣∣∣∣ Θ
t → Ai
ht 7→ pi(t).
(8)
The strategy of player i will therefore be denoted by τi while the
vector of strategies τ = (τ1, ..., τK) will be referred to a joint strat-
egy. A joint strategy τ induces in a natural way a unique sequence
of action plans (p(t))t≥1 and a unique sequence of public signals
(θ(t))t≥1. The averaged utility for player i is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Players’ utilities) Let τ = (τ1, ..., τK) be a joint
strategy. The utility for player i ∈ K if the initial channel state is
η(1), is defined by:
vi(τ, η(1)) =
∑
t≥1
λ(1− λ)t−1Eτ,pi
[
ui(p(t), η(t))|η(1)
] (9)
where (p(t))t≥1 is the sequence of power profiles induced by the
joint strategy τ .
The parameter λ is the discount factor, which can model various
effects such as the probability the game stops, the fact that players
evaluate short-term and long-term benefits differently, etc. We now
present the definition of a stochastic game.
Definition 4 (Stochastic game) A stochastic game with public
monitoring is defined as a tuple:
G = (K, (T )i∈K, (vi)i∈K, (Γi)i∈K, pi,Θ, φ), (10)
where Ti is the set of strategies for player i and vi his long-term
utility function.
Equilibrium concept. Let us define the Nash equilibrium of a
stochastic game starting with the channel state η(1).
Definition 5 (Equilibrium Strategies) A strategy τ supports an
equilibrium of the stochastic game with initial channel state η(1) if
∀i ∈ K, ∀τ ′i , vi(τ, η(1)) ≥ vi(τ
′
i , τ−i, η(1)) (11)
where −i is the standard notation to refer to the set K\{i},
τ−i = (τ1, ..., τi−1, τi+1, ..., τK). Denote Eλ(η(1)) the set of equi-
librium utilities with initial channel state η(1).
We now characterize the equilibrium utility region for the
stochastic game under study. For this, define the min-max level
v˜i of player i ∈ K as the most severe punishment level for player
i ∈ K. The feasible utility region is denoted by Fλ(η(1)). The
result of Dutta [16] states that if the transition probability pi is irre-
ducible, then the min-max levels, the feasible utility region and the
equilibrium utility region are independent of the initial state η(1).
lim
λ−→0
min
τ−i
max
τi
v˜i(τ˜i, τ˜−i, η(1)) = v˜i, ∀η(1) (12)
lim
λ−→0
Fλ(η(1)) = F, ∀η(1) (13)
lim
λ−→0
Eλ(η(1)) = E, ∀η(1) (14)
As already mentioned, irreducibility is verified under the common
assumption of i.i.d. channels. As a consequence, the equilibrium
utility region is independent of the initial channel state for a stochas-
tic game with a public signal.
Definition 6 We define the set of asymptotic feasible and individu-
ally rational payoff by:
F ∗ = {x ∈ F |xi ≥ v˜i, ∀i ∈ K} (15)
Theorem 7 Suppose that the players see the same public signal.
Then, for each utility vector u ∈ F ∗, there exists a λ0 such that
for all λ < λ0, there exists a perfect public equilibrium strategy in
the stochastic power control game, such that the long-term utility
equals u ∈ F ∗.
The proof is not given here and is based on Theorem 2 of [8]. Note
that such a characterization is very powerful. Indeed, the brute-force
technique to find the feasible utility region would be to look at all
possible action plans for the players and compute the corresponding
utilities. This would be intractable even when every player could
only choose two power levels for a finite stochastic games with 100
stages (each player could then choose between 2100 action plans).
The Folk theorem characterizes the equilibrium utilities from quan-
tities far much easier to evaluate (namely E,F, v˜i). Additionally,
as shown by Dutta [16], there is no loss of optimality by restricting
the set of strategies to Markov strategies (which only depend on the
current channel state). This will be exploited in Sec. 6
5. STRATEGIES FOR K-PLAYER GAMES
5.1. Best user selection (BUS)
The strategy we propose is based on the operating point presented
in Sec. 3. When channels gains vary from stage to stage, if every
transmitter plays at the operating point, the network is not socially
optimal (in contrast with the case where the channel state would be
constant). It turns out that we get better results in terms of social
welfare if the set of players playing the operating point at each stage
is shrunk. We name this approach the best user selection scheme.
At each stage t of the game, the receiver sets K
′t ⊂ K, the
optimal set of players playing the Operating point in terms of social
welfare. For player i ∈ K: • If i ∈ K
′t
, he is recommended to play
the Operating point at stage t; • If i /∈ K
′t
, he should not transmit
at this stage. To ensure the equilibrium of this strategy, if one of
the player deviates from the strategy, the other players punish him
by playing the one-shot Nash equilibrium for the remaining of the
game.
5.2. Threshold-based user selection (T-US)
Note that in the former strategy, the set of players playing the Op-
erating point is decided at each stage but one can also imagine a
simpler strategy with a threshold α ∈ [0, 1] set for the entire game
such that for player i ∈ K: • If ηti ≥ αηtmax, he is recommended to
play the Operating point; • If ηti < αηtmax, he should not transmit
at this stage, where ηtmax is the best channel gain realization at stage
t and ηti the channel gain realization of player i at stage t. As before,
if one of the players deviates from the strategy, the other players pun-
ish him by playing the one-shot Nash equilibrium for the remaining
of the game.
5.3. Properties of Best User Selection Scheme
Although one might think that the BUS scheme requires complex
computations at the base receiver, it happens that the former does
not have to compare all possible combinations of players. Indeed,
the BUS scheme always includes the player with the best channel
gain and a given number of other players with the following channel
gains in decreasing order. Thus, the base station just has to order
the channels gains in decreasing order and decides which gain level
is the minimum to separate players allowed to play from the others,
which is far less complex, especially when the number of players is
very large. In term of complexity, for K players, instead of consid-
ering 2K possible combinations, the base station has just to consider
K combinations.
Theorem 8 (BUS scheme for k players) At equal transmitting
rate, the best user selection of k players, k ∈ K, playing together at
the Operating point is the set of the k players with the best channels
gains.
For the strategy to be an equilibrium of the stochastic game, it is
needed that no player has interest in deviating from the given plan.
This condition is expressed by the fact that the cost of the punish-
ment must always be higher than what a player can get when deviat-
ing at one stage. It results in the following theorem
Theorem 9 (Equilibrium strategy) The BUS strategy is an equi-
librium of the stochastic game if ∀i ∈ K
λ ≤
E[ui(p
bus, η)]− E[ui(p
∗, η)]
Rηmax
σ2
f(β∗)
β∗
+ E[ui(pbus, η)]− E[ui(p∗, η)]
(16)
The expected utility of the BUS scheme can be compared to the
strategy based on the one-shot Nash equilibrium, the strategy based
on pure Time-sharing2 and the Operating point strategy.
2At each stage, only the player with the best channel gain can play.
Theorem 10 (Dominance) For equal transmission rates, for i.i.d.
channel states among the players, we have
∀i ∈ K, E[ui(p
bus, h)] ≥ E[ui(p
∗, h)]
∀i ∈ K, E[ui(p
bus, h)] ≥ E[ui(p˜, h)]
∀i ∈ K, E[ui(p
bus, h)] ≥ E[ui(p
ts, h)]
Simulations based on this strategy are discussed in Sec 6.3.
5.4. Information assumptions
For the BUS and the TUS schemes, players adapt their transmit
power at the Operating point if they are recommended to play by
the Base station. Thus, they need to know whether they are recom-
mended to play. If so, given (5), they need to know the number of
players transmitting with them and the state of their own channel.
The recommendation and the number of recommended players are
sent by the Base station whereas the channel state is observed by
the transmitter, all these signals are modeled by θ. The last neces-
sary piece of side information is due to the equilibrium condition
of the strategy: if one player deviates from the plan, he is punished
by the other players for the remaining of the game. It implies that
players must be able to detect a deviation, what can be done if they
know their SINR at each stage (see [6] for more details). From one
strategy to another, the amount of information required may vary
considerably. For instance, if one wants players to play the Social
Optimum strategy, players would have to know channels gains of ev-
ery other player whereas if they play the one-shot Nash equilibrium
they would only need to know their own channel gain and the total
number of players. To have a clear view about the amount of side
information needed to implement the discussed strategies, we pro-
vide a simplified comparison for the various strategies under study
in Fig. 1. By “deviation alarm” we mean a signal allowing players
to detect single deviations from the cooperative action plan.
6. NUMERICAL RESULTS
6.1. Simulation Parameters
To obtain numerical results, we work with the efficiency function
f(γ) = e
− a
γ with a = 2R − 1, see [2] for more details about this
efficiency function. All our results are obtained from games with
105 stages.
6.2. Two-state channel K-player game
Fig. 2 is obtained for a 10-player game where channels gains can
only reach two states ηmin and ηmax with probability { 12 ,
1
2
} for
each player and a = 0.1. It is interesting in the sense that it clearly
highlights the fact that the idea of the proposed strategy is interest-
ing when channels gains of players are sufficiently different. Indeed,
we can observe that for a channel gain ratio ηmax
ηmin
= 1, the pro-
posed strategy is equal to the classical Operating point strategy. For
ηmax
ηmin
> 1, the proposed strategy becomes more efficient. By work-
ing with random distributions for the channels gains, the case of re-
alizations with very different channels gains often occurs, which is
interesting for the proposed strategy.
CSI Recommendation signal Nb of players Deviation alarm
Pure time-sharing individual needed not needed not needed
One-shot Nash individual not needed needed not needed
Operating Point individual not needed needed SINR
T-US scheme individual needed needed SINR
BUS scheme individual needed needed SINR
Social optimum global not needed not needed SINR
Fig. 1. Information required for various stochastic strategies
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Fig. 2. Comparison of BUS utilities versus Nash utilities depending
on the ratio between the good channel state and the bad channel state
for a 10-player game.
Fig. 3 shows the achievable utility region for a 2-player, 2-states
game (with ηmax
ηmin
= 4 and a = 0.5) when considering all the possi-
ble strategies. The minmax line delimits the equilibrium region. The
mean utilities of BUS, Operating point and static Nash equilibrium
are also represented in this region. It is clear that BUS strategy is
closer to the Pareto frontier.
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Fig. 3. Achievable region with expected utilities of various strategies
6.3. Truncated Rayleigh distribution for K-player game
In Fig. 4, we consider a K-player game with K varying from 1 to
10 and a fixed to 0.1. In each game, channels states follow the
same truncated Rayleigh distribution law for every player. Four
strategies are compared on this figure: one-shot Nash equilibrium
(Sec. 3), pure Time-sharing, Operating point (equation (6)), T-US
withα = 0.5 (Sec. 5.2) and BUS (Sec. 5.1). There are several points
to notice. First, for all the studied strategies, as the number of play-
ers increases, the mean utility decreases for each player. This is due
to the fact that players see each other signal as interference: the more
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Fig. 4. Comparison of strategies utilities depending on the number
of players
players in the game, the more they have to share resources. Second,
it is clear that the Operating point and BUS strategies are more effi-
cient than one-shot Nash equilibrium or Time-sharing strategies. As
the number of players increases, this gap becomes even larger.
Fig. 5 shows a graphic representation of the different config-
urations Hi1(k) and Hi2(k) a player i can meet at each stage of
the stochastic game (owing to the symmetry in the channels distri-
bution law, the configurations probabilities are the same for every
player). Hi1(k) ⊂ Γ is the set of channels realizations where k play-
ers are recommended to play and player i is part of these players.
Hi2(k) ⊂ Γ is the set of channels realizations where player i is not
one of he k players recommended to play. The simulation is made
with 5 players and a = 0.2.
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Fig. 5. Partition of Hi1 and Hi2 for a 5-player game with BUS strat-
egy
Fig. 6 refers to theorem 9. It represents the maximum value the
discount factor λ can have for the BUS strategy to be an equilibrium
of the stochastic game. As the gap between the expected utility of
Best combination strategy and the expected utility of the one-shot
Nash equilibrium increases with the number of players, the maxi-
mum value of the discount factor increases as well.
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Fig. 6. Maximum value of discount factor λ for the BUS strategy to
be an equilibrium.
7. CONCLUSION
Conventionally, for i.i.d channels, power control schemes are de-
signed such that the power levels are chosen in an independent man-
ner from block to block. In distributed networks with selfish trans-
mitters, the point of view has to be re-considered even if the channels
are i.i.d. due to the fact that long-term interaction may change the
behavior of selfish transmitters. In order to take into account this ef-
fect and the fact that channel gains may vary from block to block, the
model of stochastic games is proposed. When transmitters observe
a public signal (e.g., the sum of received signals), a recent game-
theoretic result allows one to fully characterize the equilibrium util-
ity region. It is shown how to reach some points of this region by
assuming individual CSI only. Both analytical and simulation re-
sults show potential gains in terms of energy-efficiency induced by
the proposed model. In particular, because of long-term interaction,
transmitters may have interest of shutting down for some blocks,
leading therefore to legitimate time-sharing based control policies.
Further investigations on the proposed approach are needed. In par-
ticular, it is relevant to characterize which part of the equilibrium
utility region can be reached under the individual CSI assumption,
which is relevant to include fairness issues. Additionally, typical fea-
tures of modern wireless networks such as finite size buffers, Marko-
vian evolution law for the channel state, should be accounted for to
make the proposed framework more applicable.
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